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is required.' 2 Reynolds v. State's defines such possession, as having per-
sonal charge or exercising ownership, management or control over liquor.
To invoke any other rule in a criminal act, might involve an innocent per-
son, who, without choice, might be present at the commission of the most
heinous crime and a person, who violates the prohibition law, should have
the same consideration in the courts, as one charged with any other crimi-
nal act.
In the instant case, 14 evidence, in its most favorable light to the state,
proved only the presence of the defendant, as a passenger, and no convic-
tion of a passenger for transportation of liquor in an automobile should
be sustained, unless there is some evidence of his single or joint ownership,
possession or control thereof, or of his aiding, abetting, or encouraging
another in the crime of transportation of liquor. Such evidence should not
only be consistent with his guilt, but should be inconsistent with and ex-
clude every other hypothesis or belief of innocence. It has been supported
by many decisions that unless there is substantial evidence of facts, which
exclude every other hypothesis or belief than that of guilt, it is the duty of
the trial judge to direct the jury to return a verdict for the accused, and
where all the evidence is as consistent with innocence as with guilt, it is the
duty of the appellate court to reverse a judgment against the accused.15
J. H. H.
REAL PROPERTY-CONDITIONS SUBSEQUENT IN DEnms-This action was
brought to eject appellees from certain real estate and quiet title thereto.
Appellees, by cross-complaint, seek to quiet title as against appellants. On
October 11, 1880, N and his wife "conveyed and warranted" to the trustees
of X church "and their successors in office" the real estate in question
(one-half acre of land in consideration of thirty dollars) "in trust that said
premises shall be kept and maintained as a place of worship for the use of
X church, the building to be erected thereon free for all funeral services at
all times and under all circumstances. It shall also be free for all orthodox
denominations when not desired for use by the above named church."
A church was built, half on this half acre and half on the adjoining lot.
April 21, 1930, the trustees conveyed the property to the appellees with
covenants of warranty.
Appellants being sole heirs of N and his wife, both deceased, claim that
the deed given by N and his wife granted an estate in trust upon condi-
tions subsequent only and that the conveyance by the trustees to the appel-
'2Beander v. Barnett (1921), (Calif.), 255 U. S. 224; State v. Harris (1923),
(Ore.), 211 Pac. 944; Nelson v. State (1925), (Wis.), 203 N. W. 343; State v. Gates
(1925), (N. D.), 204 N. W. 350; Clayton v. State (1927), (Ala.), 114 So. 787; Jelks
v. State (1927), (Ga.), 137 S. E. 840; State v. Anno (1927). (Mo. App.), 296 S.
W. 825.
'3Reynolds v. State (1926), (Fla.), 111 So. 285.
24Impellizeri v. State, Supreme Court of Indiana, June 10, 1932.
15 Hart v. United States (1898), 84 Fed. 799; Vernon v. United States (1906),
146 Fed. 121; Tucker v. United States (1915), 224 Fed. 833; Weiner v. United
States (1922), 282 Fed. 799; Sullivan v. United States (1922), 282 Fed. 575; Yu8em
v. United States (1925), 8 Fed. (2nd) 6; Noscowitz v. United States (1922), 282
Fed. 575; Ridenour v. United States (1926), 14 Fed. (2nd) 888; Van Gordner v.
United States (1927), 21 Fed. (2nd) 939; Salinger v. United States (1927), 23 Fed.
(2nd) 48.
RECENT CASE NOTES
lees was a breach of these conditions and title thereby vests in the appel-
lants as heirs at law of the grantors. Appellees contend that the deed con-
tained no forfeiture clause and no conditions subsequent and that a fee
simple title vested in the church upon the execution of the deed. Held-
the deed did not contain conditions subsequent and the conveyance to the
appellees did not operate so as to vest the title in the appellants as heirs in
law of the named grantors.' The case is decided directly upon the decision
in the case of Taylor v. Campbell.2
In Taylor v. Campbell it was decided that "a conveyance of land to trus-
tees to erect a church thereon for use of members of the church according
to the rules of that church and imposing no restraint on alienation and con-
taining no provision for forfeiture, does not create a defeasible estate for
the benefit of the grantor or a condition subsequent for the violation of
which a forfeiture or reversion will result, but merely creates a trust en-
forceable at the instance of the church, but not at the instance of the
grantor, and, when land has ceased to be used for the purpose specified, the
trustees may sell it free and clear of any claims of the grantor or his heirs."
Words declaratory of the consideration for and the purpose of a con-
veyance, although a limitation of the use of the property, do not of them-
selves render an estate conditional.3 The intention of the parties to it
determines whether a deed is a conveyance in trust or one upon a condition
working, when broken, a forfeiture of the estate, in case the language is
such as to leave the instrument open to either construction.
4
According to Gray5 the remedy by entry for breach of conditions at-
tached to a conveyance fell into disuse, because, when the condition was for
the payment of money, which it usually was then, "equity would restrain a
forfeiture, and in many cases enforce payment as a trust."
Again in Sugden:6 "What by the old law was deemed a devise upon con-
dition would now, perhaps, in almost every case, be construed a devise in
fee upon a trust, and, by this construction, instead of an heir taking advan-
tage of the condition broken, the cestui que trust can compel an observ-
ance of the trust by a suit in equity.
There is a marked difference between a devise upon a condition subse-
quent for a specified religious or charitable purpose and one upon a trust
to be devoted to a particular use.
A condition broken forfeits the estate and forever deprives the devisee
of the gift, while the heirs become seized of the first estate free of inter-
mediate charges or incumbrances and of expenditures and improvements
upon the premises. 7 If the limitations are simply regulations to guide the
trustees and explanatory of the terms upon which the devise was made a
2ANewell v. The Success Grauge No. 2185 of Elkhart County, Indiana, Inc., Ap
pellate Court of Indiana, July 26, 1932.
2 (1912), 50 Ind. App. 515, 98 N. E. 657.
3 6 Am. & Engl. Ency. Law (2d Ed.), pp. 501, 502.
,'Neely v. Hoskins (1892), 84 Me. 386, 24 Atl. 882; Hayes v. St. Paul M. E.
Church (1902), 196 IIl. 633, 63 N. E. 1040; Brown v. Caldwell (1883), 23 W. Va.
187, 48 Am. Rep. 376; Sheets v. Vandalia R. Co. (1920), 74 Ind. App. 597, 127 N.
E. 609.
sGray, "Perpetintics", Sec. 282, note.
' 1 Sugden, 'Towers" (8th Ed.) 106.
7Stanley v. Colt (1867), 5 Wall. 119, 18 L. Ed. 502.
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trust is created which those who take the estate are bound to perform and
in case of breach, equity will step in and compel performance. The estate
is preserved and devoted to the use prescribed by the devisor and his heirs
can not resume it.8
There is little doubt that presumptions are adverse to the defeasance of
estates and doubts will be construed against such restrictions as might so
operate, 9 however, where the intention of the grantor is clear and the words
used fairly express his intention to create a condition the courts will give
effect to the condition.' 0
Nevertheless, it appears that most courts are strongly inclined to con-
strue devises to religious societies, specifying the use to which the estate is
to be devoted as devises in trust."1
Once the land is given to the trustees of a church it is not subject to a
reversionary interest in the heirs of the grantor nor in the grantor him-
self.12 The theory is that there is title coupled with a trust.13 In case of a
palpable breach of trust equitable aid may be invoked by some one leav-
ing an interest in the specific carrying out of the trust to compel its exe-
cution by the devisee.14
Thus it appears "where the language of the clause in the deed indicates
the simple purpose to define and regulate the use which shall be made of
real granted, and where it doesn't appear the use is for the special benefit
of the grantor and his heirs, it will not be construed as a condition sub-
sequent."'3 E. L. L.
TEACHERS' TENURE LAw-CoNsTiTuTioNALiTY-POwER To DISMISS PER-
MANENT TEACHERs--The plaintiff, a school teacher, had been employed by
the defendant school city for more than five years prior to May 5, 1930. On
that date he entered into a new contract, under which he served until July
24, 1931, at which time he was discharged as a result of a hearing held by
the defendant in which it was found that he had been guilty of insubordina-
tion in refusing to obey a reasonable regulation of the defendant-that is,
that all teachers should retire when they attained the age of seventy. The
8Stanley v. Colt (1867), 5 Wall. 119, 18 L. Ed. 502.
9 Summer v. Darnell (1870), 128 Ind. 38, 27 N. E. 162; Sherman v. Town of Jef-
ferson (1916), 274 Ill. 294, 113 N. E. 624; Sellers Chapel M. E. Church's Petition
(1891), 139 Pa. 61, 21 At]. 145.
10 Sheets v. Vandalia Ry. Co. (1920), 74 Ind. App. 597, 127 N. E. 609; Van Horn
v. Mercer (1902), 29 Ind. App. 277, 64 N. E. 531.
UStanley v. Colt (1867), 5 Wall. 119, 18 L. Ed. 502; Schier v. Trinity Church
(1871), 109 Mass. 1; Downer v. Rayburn (1905), (Ill.), 73 N. E. 364; First Presby.
Churchv . Bailey (1916), 97 Atl. 583; 11 L. R. A. (N. S.) 509, note.
"Bailey v. Wells (1891), 82 Iowa 131, 47 N. W. 988; Strong v. Doty (1873),
32 Wis. 381; Packard v. Ames (1860), 16 Gray (Mass.) 327.
13Mill; v. Davison (1896), 54 N. J. Eq. 659, 35 L. R. A. 113, 35 Atl. 1072; Wat-
terson v. Ury (1894), 5 Ohio C. C. 347, Affirm. 52 Ohio St. 637, 44 N. E. 1149;
Sohipper v. St. Palais (1871), 37 Ind. 505.
14 Strong v. Doty (1873), 32 Wis. 381; Baldwin v. Atwood (1854), 23 Conn. 367;
Rawson v. Uxbridge (1863), 7 Allen 125, 83 Am. Dec. 670.
15Hutchinson v. Ulrigh (1893), 145 Ill. 336, 34 N. E. 556; Farnham v. Thomp-
son (1885), 34 Minn. 330, 26 N. W. 9; Rawson v. Uxbridge (1863), 32 Wis. 381;
Sohier v. Trinity Church (1871), 109 Mass. 1; Neely v. Hockins (1892), 84 Me. 386,
24 AtI. 882; Episcopal City Mission v. Appelton (1875), 117 Mass. 326; Adams v.
First Baptist Church (1907), 148 Mich. 140, 111 N. W. 757.
